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CONFLICTS BETWEEN "OTHER INSURANCE" CLAUSES IN
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
Double insurance arises when an insured who has sustained a
loss finds that his loss is covered by the policies of two or more insurers.' In anticipation of this frequently occurring situation, most
automobile liability insurance companies insert "other insurance"
clauses into their respective policies that purport to limit or avoid
their own liability when there is other valid and collectible insurance
covering the same loss. Unfortunately, the presence of such clauses
in two or more policies covering the same loss precipitates litigation,
since each of the clauses attempts to limit one insurer's liability at
the expense of the other insurers involved.2 The resulting conflicts
have been resolved by the courts in various ways, and several rules
have developed to assist in determining the central issue of whether
coverage under one particular policy is valid and collectible insurance that will actuate the "other insurance" clause contained in anThis note will explore these
other policy covering the same loss.
3
clauses, conflicts, rules and solutions.

Origin of the Problem
In the property insurance field, to avoid overinsuring, insurers
originally inserted provisions in their policies that prohibited the
insured from obtaining additional insurance on the same property.4
Eventually, these prohibitions were relaxed and "other insurance"
I "A double insurance exists where the same person is insured by several insurers separately in respect to the same subject and interest." CAL.
INS. CODE

§

590. See also United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 172 F.2d

836, 844 (9th Cir. 1949).
2 There are two related problems peculiar to states with mandatory
insurance statutes, e.g., CAL. VEHCLE CODE §§ 16430, 16451 (Supp. 1969).

The

first problem is whether "other insurance" clauses reduce the amount of
legally required coverage. The other problem is whether it makes any difference that one insurer's policy was issued to satisfy a mandatory insurance
statute, while the other insurer's was not. See generally 7 A.m. Jun. 2d
Automobile Insurance § 200 (1963).
3 The problem does not arise in the life insurance field as a life insurance
policy is not a contract of indemnity, but only a contract to pay a certain sum
upon death. See Insurance Co. v. Bailey, 80 U.S. 615, 619 (13 Wall. 1871);
cf. Central Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195, 205 (1888). For a discussion of other
insurance clauses in the health and accident insurance field, see Note, Conflicting Interpretations Of "Other Insurance" Clauses, 28 IND. L.J. 429, 439-41
(1953).
4 See generally Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Copeland, 90 Ala. 386, 389-90, 8
So. 48, 49-50 (1890); New Brunswick Fire Ins. Co. v. Morris Plan Bank, 136
Va. 402, 407, 118 S.E. 236, 236-37 (1923).
[1292)
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clauses were developed to handle double insurance situations.5 Inevitably, the "other insurance" clauses conflicted with one another,
and litigation between insurers resulted. Legislation finally resolved
the conflict in fire insurance policies by providing that the loss shall
be prorated among all insurers involved. 6 Curiously, nothing similar
from a legislative standpoint has been effected with respect to automobile liability policies.
In the automobile liability field, double insurance situations can
arise in a great many ways. 7 For example, in states that have a
permissive use statute,8 drivers of automobiles not owned by them
are, in effect, given coverage under the policies of both the driver
and the owner. 9 Also, double insurance often arises with rental
automobiles since a lessee is usually covered by his own policy, by
the lessor's policy 10 and, in some cases, by his employer's policy."
5 Russ, The Double Insurance Problem-A Proposal, 13 HASTINGS L.J.
183 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Russ]; Comment, Concurrent Coverage In
Automobile LiabilityInsurance, 65 COLum. L. Rzv. 319, 320 (1965).
6 E.g., CAL. I S.CODE § 2071. For a discussion of the reasons for and
the development of California's standard form fire insurance policy see Weinstock & Maloney, History And Development Of Insurance Law In California,
CAL. INS. CODE AN. 1, 26-28 (West vol. 42, 1955).
7 See Russ, supra note 5, at 184 (indicating that the extension of rules
for determining tort liability has also affected the number of situations);
Comment, ConcurrentCoverage In Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 CoLUM.
L. REv. 319 (1965). In one case involving a truck and trailer rig, there was
double coverage because the truck was insured by one insurer and the trailer
by another. Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d 311 (1935).
8

E.g., CAL. VEMCLE

CODE

§ 16451 (Supp. 1969).

For a case involving a

statute that requires the extension of coverage to situations where the insured
is driving an unowned vehicle, see Dekat v. American Auto. Fire Ins. Co.,
146 Kan. 955, 73 P.2d 1080 (1937).
9 E.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d
419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Transport
Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 90, 51 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1966).

See generally

Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co., 48 Cal. 2d 31, 307 P.2d 359
(1957); Bonfils v. Pacific Auto. Ins. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 766
(1958). This includes cases where a customer uses a "loaner" from a garage.
E.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co., 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d
675 (1959); Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39 Wis. 2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322
(1968).
10 E.g., Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d
189 (6th Cir. 1959); Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Transit Cas. Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 719,
56 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1967); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Continental Nat'l Group, 213
Cal. App. 2d 91, 28 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1963); Athey v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 200
Cal. App. 2d 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1962); Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956); Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v.

Employers' Liab. Assurance Co., 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949); New
Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 34 ll. 2d 424, 216
N.E.2d 665 (1966); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110,
341 P.2d 110, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959).
11 E.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 224
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Insurers and courts have contributed to the problem by placing
broad definitions on terms used in the policies, thereby extending
the policy coverage. 12 Consequently, here, as in the property insurance field, insurers have made extensive use of "other insurance"
clauses. Although it has been said that the insurance companies use
these clauses to protect themselves, 13 to avoid litigation, 14 or to facilitate settlements, 5 the probable reason for their use is to reduce 6
or avoid 7 liability when there is other insurance covering the same
loss. To understand the problem fully, the various types of "other
insurance" clauses that are employed must be distinguished.

"Other Insurance" Clauses
One of the three basic types of "other insurance" clauses 8 used

in the automobile liability insurance field is the escape clause. 9 It
is analogous to the prohibition against other insurance, originally
used in property insurance policies, and provides:
If other valid insurance exists protecting the Insured from liability
...
this policy shall be null and void with respect to such specific
Cal. App. 2d 81, 36 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1964); Continental Cas. Co. v. Hartford
Accident &Indem. Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 78, 28 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
12 See Gorton, A Further Study of the Effect of the "Other Insurance"
Provision Upon Automobile Liability Insurance, 16 INs. CouNsEL J. 190, 191

(1949); Russ, supra note 5, at 184; 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157, 158 (1958). For example, when one loads or unloads another's vehicle he is a "user" of that
vehicle and, as such, is covered by the owner's policy as well as by any other
applicable policy such as an employer's general liability policy. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal. Rptr. 12
(1961); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App.
2d 90, 51 Cal. Rptr. 168 (1966); Colby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d
38, 33 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963); Brown & Risjord, Loading and Unloading: The
Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 INs. CoUNsEL J. 197 (1959);
Gowan, Loading and Unloading-Hired Cars-Concurrent Coverage-Industry
Recommendations, 26 INs. CouNsEL J. 93 (1959). A self-propelled mobile
crane was declared to be a motor vehicle in Colby v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
220 Cal. App. 2d 38, 33 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963).
'3 5 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 157, 158 (1958).
14

Comment, "Other Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. REv. 147

(1952).
15

Note, Conflicting Interpretations of "Other Insurance" Clauses, 28

IND. L.J. 429, 431 (1953).

16 Russ, supra note 5, at 183; Comment, Concurrent Coverage In Au-

tomobile Liability Insurance, 65 CoLum.

L. REv. 319, 320-21

(1965).

Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of Double Coverage
And "Other Insurance" Clauses,38 MNN. L. REV. 838, 839 (1954).
18 See Comment, Concurrent Coverage In Automobile Liability
Insur17

ance, 65 CoLtM. L. REv. 319, 320-21 (1965); Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of Double Coverage And "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 1MnM.
L. REv. 838, 839 (1954).

19 See 7 AM. Jun. 2d Automobile Insurance § 201 (1963).
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hazard otherwise covered, whether the Insured is specifically named
in such other policy or not .... 20
The purpose of the escape clause is to avoid all liability when a
double insurance situation exists. When effective, the clause gives
the insurer a windfall in that premiums are collected from the insured, and yet no liability is incurred when other insurance covers
the same loss.
A second type of clause frequently used in automobile liability
policies is the excess clause. 21 One version of the excess clause
attempts to limit the insurer's liability to that amount of the insured's loss which exceeds the policy limits of the other insurer.
If there is other insurance against an occurrence covered by this
over and
policy, this insurance shall be deemed excess insurance
22
above the applicable limits of such other insurance.
A somewhat different23 result is brought about by another version,
the limited excess clause:
[Tihe insurance hereunder shall apply only as excess insurance over
any similar insurance available to the [insured], and this insurance
shall then apply only in the amount by which the applicable limit of
applicable limit
liability of this endorsement exceeds 2the
4 sum of the
of liability of all such other insurance.
With this clause the insurer limits its liability to the difference between its policy limits and the sum of the policy limits of all other
insurance covering the loss. To illustrate, suppose the applicable
policy limit of the insurer's policy with the limited excess clause
was $25,000 and there were two other collectible policies with limits
of $10,000 and $12,000. The insurer with the limited excess clause
would be liable for only $3,000 even if the insured's loss exceeded
$25,000. Extending this reasoning further, the limited excess clause
becomes a complete escape clause if the total amount of other insurance equals or exceeds the policy limits of this particular policy.
In contrast, it might be noted that the extent to which a regular
excess clause acts as an escape clause is measured by the difference
between the pro rata share of liability and what the insured actually
must pay when the excess clause is given effect.
20 Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Co., 91 Cal. App.
2d 129, 130, 204 P.2d 647, 648 (1949).
21 See 7 Amr. JuR. 2d Automobile Insurance § 201 (1963).
22 Oil Base, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 467,
299 P.2d 952, 962 (1956).
23 This type of clause has been referred to as a "modified escape" clause.
Russ, supra note 5, at 184. In this discussion, the term 'limited excess"
clause is used since it describes the provision more accurately in that
there may be some instances where an insurer using such a clause will incur
liability. E.g., McFarland v. Chicago Exp., Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir. 1952);
Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602
(1956); Air Transp. Mfg. Co. v. Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal.
App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
24 Vignali v. Farmers Equitable Ins. Co., 71 Ill. App. 2d 114, 119, 216
N.E.2d 827, 830 (1966) (emphasis added).
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Excess insurance policies are to be distinguished from ordinary
policies containing excess clauses. By its terms, no liability is incurred under the excess policy unless the insured's loss exceeds a
specified amount, whereas the policy containing the excess clause is
not treated as excess insurance, but rather as primary insurance,
unless there is other valid and collectible insurance that will effectuate the excess clause. As will be seen, most courts have been willing
to find such other insurance.
25
The third type of "other insurance" clause is the prorate clause.
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this
policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated
in the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all
valid and collectible insurance against such loss .... 26
By the terms of this clause, each insurer bears a proportionate amount
reached when
of the loss. This is essentially the same result as that
27
none of the policies contain "other insurance" clauses.
Combinations of these three clauses are also frequently used:
If the insured has other insurance against a loss covered by this
policy the company shall not be liable under this policy for a greater
proportion of such loss than the applicable limit of liability stated in
the declaration bears to the total applicable limit of liability of all
valid and collectible insurance against such loss; provided, however,
the insurance under this policy with respect to loss arising out of the
maintenance or use of any hired automobile insured on a cost of
hire basis or the use of any non-owned automobile shall
be excess
28
insurance over any other valid and collectible insurance.
The combination could also involve an escape clause in place of either
the prorate or excess clause in the above example. But regardless of the composition of the combination provision, only one of its
component clauses is activated in any given situation.
With the exception of double insurance situations where (1) none
of the policies involved have "other insurance" clauses, (2) where all
of the policies involved contain prorate clauses, or (3) where only
one of the policies involved has an "other insurance" clause, the mere
presence of such clauses in two or more policies causes conflict. For
example, when one insurer's clause declares it will prorate the loss
with other insurers and the other insurer's clause declares it will
only assume liability for any loss exceeding the limits of the first
policy, the clauses, by their very terms, appear to be irreconcilable.
As a consequence of such conflicts, the courts have been called upon
to determine which of the clauses is to be given effect.
25 For a discussion of the history of proration, see Lamb-Weston, Inc. v.
Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341 P.2d 110, prorationmodified, 219 Ore.
129, 131-37, 346 P.2d 643, 644-47 (1959).
26 Home Indem. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 942, 960,
60 Cal. Rptr. 544, 558 (1967).
27 See Dekat v. American Auto. Fire Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 955, 73 P.2d 1080
(1937).
28 Home Indem. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 251 Cal. App. 2d 942, 960, 60
Cal. Rptr. 544, 558 (1967).
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Prior Judicial Solutions
First in Time
Some courts turned to the property insurance field for a guide
29
to determine which of the conflicting clauses was to be given effect.
By this guide, the insurer which issued its policy first was declared
to be primarily liable since, at the time the policy was written, there
was no other insurance to activate its "other insurance" clause.3 0
By applying this doctrine to automobile liability insurance cases, the
insurer that issued its policy first was deemed to be primarily liable
and effect was given to the second insurer's "other insurance" clause.3 '
This approach to resolving the conflict has been rejected or disregarded in most jurisdictions 2 since neither insurer is strictly liable
for a loss until the loss occurs. Then, at that time, the insurers become liable simultaneously.
Specific v. General
Still seeking a policy that could be declared primary, some courts
adopted the so-called specific v. general test.3 3 By this test the policy
that covered the particular loss more specifically was declared primarily liable, while the "other insurance" clause of the more general
policy was given effect.3 4
A somewhat different application of this test is illustrated by
Zurich General Accident and Liability Insurance Company v. Clamor,3 5 which rejected the first in time theory 38 but applied the specific
v. general approach to the "other insurance" clauses instead of to the
entire policy. The more specific "other insurance" clause was given
29 Russ, supra note 5, at 184; Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple
Coverage, 40 DENVER L. CENTER J. 259, 265 (1963); cf. Watson, The "Other
Insurance"Dilemma, 518 Izs. L.J. 151, 153 (1966).
30 Russ, supra note 5, at 184; Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple
Coverage, 40 DENVER L. CENTER 3. 259, 265 (1963).
31 E.g., New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co.,
108 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1940).
32 See, e.g., Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fideltity & Guar.
Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 719-20 (7th Cir. 1941); Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon
Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 120, 341 P.2d 110, 115, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643
(1959); Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-MultipleCoverage, 40 DENVER L. CENTER J. 259, 265 (1963); Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of Double
Coverage And "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MfNN. L. REV. 838, 846-47 (1954).
33 E.g., Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 138 Ohio St. 488, 35 N.E.2d 836 (1941).
84 Id. Here one insurer was declared primarily liable because its policy
covered losses arising from the use of a truck while the other insurer's policy
covered any loss arising upon the insured's premises.
35 124 F.2d 717, 720 (7th Cir. 1941).
30 Id. at 719-20.
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effect and the more general "other insurance" clause was ignored.3 7
Either application of this approach involves questionable reasoning, for after determining that both insurers cover the loss, it does
not follow that the one which covers it more specifically is more

38
liable than the other.
39
abandoned.
generally

Consequently, this approach has also been

Primary Tortfeasor
Another solution to the conflicting clause problem was to hold
as primarily liable the insurer having the primary tortfeasor as its

named insured. 40

This seems to have been nothing more than an

application of the specific v. general approach, since one insurer

was made primarily liable because it named the active tortfeasor in
its policy, i.e., its policy was more specific. This solution was quite
limited since it did not cover situations in which the primary tortfeasor was not the named insured in any of the policies involved, or

conversely, was the named insured in all the policies involved. As
in the case of the first in time and the specific v. general tests, the
primary tortfeasor solution has, for the most part, been rejected.4 1
The courts that adopted the first in time, specific v. general and
primary tortfeasor doctrines must have recognized the impossible task
of reconciling conflicting "other insurance" clauses since each test
resulted in one insurer being declared primarily liable. 42 As such,
87 Id. at 720.
88 This argument was recognized and rejected in General Ins. Co. of
America v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 426, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462, 468
(1966), relying in part on CAL. Civ. CODE § 3534, which provides that "[p]articular expressions qualify those which are general."
39 See Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195
F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952); Employers Liab. Assurance Corp. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 102 Cal. App. 2d 188, 194, 227 P.2d 53, 56-57 (1951); LambWeston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 120-21, 341 P.2d 110, 115,
proration modified, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959); cf. Consolidated Shippers
v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 288, 291-92, 114 P.2d 34, 36
(1941).
40 E.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Penn Mut. Indem. Co., 161 F.2d 62, 63
(3d Cir. 1947).
41 "The purpose of indemnity insurance is to provide protection for the
'wrongdoer.' We can see no difference between the equities of an insurer
whose named insured is the actual wrongdoer and another insurer whose
named insured is the owner of the vehicle which the wrongdoer uses." General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419, 423, 51 Cal.
Rptr. 462, 466 (1966); see Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab.
Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717, 719 (7th Cir. 1942); Woodrich Constr. Co. v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 252 Minn. 86, 95-98, 89 N.W.2d 412, 420-21 (1958); LambWeston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 121-22, 341 P.2d 110, 115,
proration modified, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959).
42 Russ, supra note 5, at 185.
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that insurer's "other insurance" clause was necessarily disregarded,
thereby eliminating the conflict. Nevertheless, the majority of jurisdictions do not admit that it is impossible to reconcile conflicting
"other insurance" clauses, but claim instead to be able to give effect to
48
the intent of both insurers.

CurrentJudicial Solutions
It should be noted first that when the conflicting clauses are of
the same type, most jurisdictions ignore the "other insurance" clauses
and prorate the loss among the insurers. 44 To give effect to both
clauses would leave the insured without protection, and there is no
logical basis for declaring one clause to be effective, while ignoring
the other clause.45 Thus, when there are two conflicting excess
clauses, neither is given effect and the loss is prorated between the
insurers. 46 Of course, there is no conflict at all when both policies
contain a prorate clause because both clauses can be effected accord47
ing to their terms without depriving the insured of any coverage.
The Majority Approach
Where the "other insurance" clauses differ, the majority of juris43 Billings, The "Other Insurance" Provision of the Automobile Policy,
1949 INs. L.J. 498, 504; Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs.
L.J. 151, 154, 156-57.
44 Escape v. Escape: Weddell v. Road Transp. & Gen. Ins. Co., [1932]
2 K.B. 563 (1931). No American cases in point have been found.
Excess v. Excess: Weekes v. Atlantic Nat'l Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 264 (9th Cir.
1966); General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App. 2d 419,
51 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's,
224 Cal. App. 2d 81, 36 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1964); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Continental
Nat'l Group, 213 Cal. App. 2d 91, 28 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1963); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 78, 28 Cal. Rptr. 606
(1963); Athey v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 10, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1962); Truck Ins. Exch. v. Torres, 193 Cal. App. 2d 483, 14 Cal. Rptr. 408
(1961); Oil Base, Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal. App. 2d 453, 299 P.2d
952 (1956); see American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 200 Cal. App.
2d 543, 19 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1962) (involving three policies, one of which apparently contained no "other insurance" clause). Contra, Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 242 Cal. App. 2d 90, 51 Cal. Rptr. 168
(1966) (specific v. general approach used); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection
& Ins. Co. v. Cochran Oil Mill & Ginnery Co., 26 Ga. App. 288, 105 S.E. 856
(1921) (specific v. general approach used).
45 Athey v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 10, 13, 19 Cal. Rptr.
89, 91 (1962).
46 E.g., General Ins. Co. of America v. Truck Ins. Exch., 242 Cal. App.
2d 419, 51 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1966).
47 See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Palatine Ins. Co., 150 Cal. 252,
88 P. 907 (1907); Reed v. Pacific Indem. Co., 101 Cal. App. 2d 151, 225 P.2d 255
(1950); Consolidated Shippers Inc. v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 45 Cal. App.
2d 288, 112 P.2d 673 (1941); Lamb v. Belt Cas. Co., 3 Cal. App. 2d 624, 40 P.2d
311 (1935).
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dictions have attempted to adhere to the intents of all the insurers
involved as expressed in their "other insurance" clauses.4 8 In doing
so, they have developed a priority system whereby, in any given
conflict, one type of "other insurance" clause is given priority over
another type. In order to see the unsuccessful result of this approach,
both in reconciling the conflicting clauses and in giving effect to the
intent of each insurer, each set of conflicting clauses should be considered separately.
Proratev. Escape

Some authors4 9 speak as if there are several cases involving
the prorate v. escape clause conflict, but an examination of these
cases"0 shows that they actually involve a conflict between prorate
clauses and limited excess clauses. 51 Only one case has been found
which actually involved a prorate v. escape conflict in any way, and
48

Note 43 and accompanying text supra.

49

Risjord, Other Insurance Or The Tortuous Channels Of Litigation

Involving The Conflict Between Fortuitous Adversaries, 29 INs. CouNSE-r J.
612, 613 (1962); Russ, supra note 5, at 187; Comment, Concurrent Coverage In
Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 CoLum. L. Ruv. 319, 328-29 (1965); Note,
Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of Double Coverage And "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MDnN. L. REv. 838, 853-54 (1954); Note, Effect of Conflicting "Other Insurance" Clauses, 41 WAsH. L. REV. 564, 568 (1966); 5 U.C.
L.A.L. REv. 157, 161-62 (1958).
50 For example, in McFarland v. Chicago Exp. Inc., 200 F.2d 5 (7th Cir.
1952), the clause in question provided:
If other valid insurance exists... this policy shall be null and void
with respect to such specific hazard otherwise covered . . . provided,
however, that if the applicable limit of liability of this policy exceeds
the applicable limit of liability of such other valid insurance, then
this policy shall apply as excess insurance against such hazard in an
amount equal to the applicable limit of liability of this policy minus
the applicable limit of liability of such other valid insurance.
Id. at 6. In Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617,
301 P.2d 602 (1956), the clause provided:
If the insured has other valid and collectible insurance against a loss
covered by this policy, the insurance under this policy shall be excess
insurance with respect to such loss but shall apply only in the amount
by which the applicable limit of liability stated in the declarations
exceeds the total applicable limits of liability of such other insurance.
Id. at 619, 301 P.2d at 604-05. The clause in Air Transp. Afg. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 91 Cal. App. 2d 192, 204 P.2d 647 (1949)
provided:
If other valid insurance exists protecting the insured from liability...
this policy shall be null and void with respect to such specific hazard
otherwise covered ... provided, however, that if the applicable limit
of liability of this policy exceeds the applicable limit of liability of
such other valid insurance, then this policy shall apply as excess insurance against such hazard in an amount equal to the applicable limit of
liability of this policy minus the applicable limit of liability of such
other valid insurance.
Id. at 130, 204 P.2d at 648.
51 See notes 23 & 24 and accompanying text supra.
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there the Supreme Court of Washington surprisingly 52 gave effect to
the escape clause.5 3 The case is of questionable authority, however,
since the action was merely between the insured and the insurer that
had used the escape clause in its policy,54 that is, the insurer with the
prorate clause was not a party to the action. Thus, although the court
determined that there was other valid and collectible insurance that
triggered the defendant insurer's escape clause, the decision was
based on an interpretation of the defendant's contract with the insured, 55 and even if the other insurance policy had contained a different type of "other insurance" clause, or no clause at all, the result
probably would have been the same.
There are at least two undesirable consequences which occur
when an escape clause is given effect. First, the amount of insurance
available to the insured is reduced. Secondly, the insurer using the
escape clause is given a windfall, since it collects the premium from
the insured and yet avoids liability when a loss occurs to the insured. Consequently, it would seem preferable to prorate the loss
between the insurers.
Proratev. Excess 56
In the situation involving a conflict between a prorate and an

excess clause, the rule has developed that "when an excess clause in
one .

.

. policy conflicts with another 'other insurance' clause, and

more particularly a 'pro-rata' clause, in a second policy, the excess
clause controls and is to be given its full effect." 57 In other words,
"'excess insurance' is not considered to be 'other valid and collectible
insurance"' 5 8 under this rule and thus is not within the purview of
the prorate clause of another policy.
The decision in this particular situation that a policy with an
excess clause is not "valid and collectible insurance" while a policy
with a prorate clause is "valid and collectible insurance" appears to
have been made rather arbitrarily. There would seem to be no reason
why a policy containing a prorate clause is any more "valid and
collectible" than a policy containing an excess provision. Accordingly,
the majority rule has been properly criticized as depending upon
52 Comment, "Other Insurance" Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. REV. 147,
150 (1952).
53 Miller v. Allstate Ins. Co., 66 Wash. 2d 871, 405 P.2d 712 (1965).
54 Id. at 874, 876, 405 P.2d at 713-14, 715.
55 Id. at 874, 405 P.2d at 714.
6 The majority result can also be obtained by applying the specific
v. general test previously considered. For example, an excess provision is
more specific than a prorate clause so the excess clause controls. Zurich Gen.
Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717 (7th Cir. 1941). See text

accompanying note 35 supra.
57 Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d 189,
193 (6th Cir. 1959).
58

Id.
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which policy was read first.59 One author, however, while admitting
the validity of the criticism, nevertheless defends the rule as one

recognizing and giving effect to the intent of the insurers. 60
[T]he usual intent of the insurer [using the excess clause] is that
the policy will afford only secondary coverage when the loss is covered by "other insurance." . . . [A] provision that limits a policy to
only pro rata liability in the event of concurrent coverage usually is
when other valid and collectible
intended to become effective only
primary insurance is available. 6 1
In other words, he argues that when there is other insurance, the
insurer employing the excess clause intends to be secondarily liable
only, whereas the insurer employing the prorate clause intends to be
primarily liable. This argument seems to overlook the fact that the
insurer using the prorate clause intends to be liable for only part of
the loss. Consequently, the majority rule only gives effect to the
intent of one of the insurers, and the purported justification for the
rule-that
of giving effect to the intent of each insurer-has not been
62
effected.

Excess v. Escape
In a conflict between excess and escape clauses, effect is usually
given to the excess clause,63 primarily because giving effect to the
escape clause would give the insurer using it a windfall and because
64
it would reduce the amount of coverage available to the insured.
59 Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958, 960 (9th Cir. 1952).
60 Comment, Concurrent Coverage In Automobile Liabilty Insurance, 65
COLuIm. L. REV. 319, 327-28 (1965).
61 Id. at 328.
62 Contra, American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co. of America,
52 Cal. 2d 507, 512-13, 341 P.2d 675, 678-79 (1959), where the court stated that
the only meaningful construction is that the excess clause controls in every
situation falling within its terms and that the prorate clause governs in all
other situations.
63 E.g., Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d 717
(7th Cir. 1941); New Amsterdam Cas. Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds, 34
Ill. 2d 424, 216 N.E.2d 665 (1966). Contra, Faltersack v. Vanden Boogaard, 39
Wis. 2d 64, 158 N.W.2d 322 (1968) (escape clause given effect). See also Russ,
supra note 5, at 187; Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage, 40
DENVER L. CENTER J. 259, 268 (1963); Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma,
1966 INs. L.J. 151, 154; Comment, Concurrent Coverage In Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 CoLUM. L. REV. 319, 329 (1965); Note, Conflicting Interpretations Of "Other Insurance" Clauses, 28 IND. L.J. 429, 434 (1953); Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of Double Coverage And "Other Insurance"
Clauses, 38 MINN. L. REV. 838, 854 (1954); Comment, "Other Insurance"
Clauses Conflict, 5 STAN. L. REV. 147, 148 (1952); Note, Effect of Conflicting
"Other Insurance" Clauses, 41 WAsE. L. REV. 564, 567-68 (1966); 5 U.C.L.A.L.
Rev. 157, 160 (1958).
64 Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958, 959 (9th Cir. 1952); Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Co. v. Clamor, 124 F.2d
717, 720 (7th Cir. 1941).
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Yet the courts adhering to the majority rule,65 in giving effect to the
excess clause, fail to realize that they merely shift the benefit of the
windfall to the insurer using that clause.66
If the limited excess clause continues to be treated as an escape
clause, as it has been by some authors6" and at least one court,68
a conflict between a limited excess clause and an escape clause probably will be construed as involving two escape clauses and the loss
would be prorated. 69 Technically, however, if the courts interpret
the limited excess clause accurately and follow the majority rule of
ignoring the escape clause, there would not only be a windfall to the
insurer using the limited excess clause, but in addition, the amount of
coverage available to the insured would be reduced. 0
The Minority or Oregon Approach
As a result of the above mentioned inconsistencies and fallacies
in the majority rule, a minority position was founded. In 1952, when
an Oregon court was confronted with the excess v. escape clause
conflict, 71 the court rejected the various solutions reached by other
jurisdictions, including the majority approach of giving effect to the
excess clause, 72 and instead disregarded both clauses completely by
prorating the loss between both insurers. Subsequently, the rule of
73
proration has been applied to conflicts between other sets of clauses.
The rule operates by disregarding the "other insurance" clauses in
all policies and by prorating the insured's loss among all insurers
involved.74
65 See cases cited note 63 supra.
66 Assume A and B each issue policies with $10,000 limits and a loss
of $10,000 occurs. Assume further that both insurers cover the loss and that
A has used an escape clause in its policy, whereas B has used an excess clause.
If effect is given to the excess clause, B gets the windfall which most courts
would deny A by refusing to give effect to his escape clause. B has collected
premiums from the insured but has avoided liability when the loss to the
insured occurred. If B's excess clause was of the limited type, the amount of
coverage available to the insured would be reduced to $10,000 and he would
be required to bear any loss exceeding that amount. Thus, not only would
B get a windfall but the insured would not have maximum protection.
67 See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
68 Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301
P.2d 602 (1956).
09 See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
70 See note 66 supra.
71 Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. 195
F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1952).
72 Id. at 959-60.
73 E.g., Lamb-Weston, Inc. v. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co., 219 Ore. 110, 341
P.2d 110, prorationmodified, 219 Ore. 129, 346 P.2d 643 (1959).
74 Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d
958 (9th Cir. 1952), where the court relies upon the rule that "where neither
policy has an 'other insurance' provision" the loss is prorated. Id. at 960;
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Such a rule is highly desirable. It does not arbitrarily pick one
of the conflicting clauses and give effect to it; it does not deprive the
insured of any coverage; it is not prejudicial in giving a windfall to
one insurer at the expense of another; it does not encourage litigation
between insurers; it does not delay settlements. 5 On the other hand,
it does enable underwriters to predict the losses of the insurers more
accurately; it does preclude the use of illogical rules developed by
the courts (e.g., first in time, specific v. general and primary tortfeasor doctrines); and it does give a basis for uniformity of result. In
addition, prorating the loss among all insurers is a rule that can be
applied regardless of the number of insurers involved and regardless
of the type of conflicts that are created by the "other insurance"
clauses. Finally, the rule is76simpler, more convenient and easier to
apply than the majority rule.

Although the Oregon Rule has not been popular with the courts,77
many writers consider it desirable. 78 It has been criticized, however,
as being nothing more than "a simple, convenient solution to the
problem" which violates "the foremost rule of the law of contracts"
in that it fails "to give full effect to the intent of the parties.179
It has been charged as well that, in an excess clause, the word
"'excess' means exactly what it says .... 80 Left unanswered is
the question of why the conflicting "other insurance" clause does not
also mean "exactly what it says." As noted above, it is usually impossible to give effect to the intent of all the parties in this type
of litigation. The insurers involved in any given conflict intended
to indemnify the insured when a covered loss occurred. At the same
time, the very fact that "other insurance" clauses are inserted in
cf. Dekat v. American Auto. Fire Ins. Co., 146 Kan. 955, 73 P.2d 1080 (1937);
text accompanying note 27 supra.
75 To avoid delay in making a settlement with an insured, it is not
uncommon for insurers to execute an agreement among themselves that they
will contribute to the settlement without waiving any rights each insurer
may have against another insurer. E.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 224 Cal. App. 2d 81, 36 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1964).

76 See, e.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal.
2d 318, 419 P.2d 641, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455, 17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961).
77 See Citizens Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 273 F.2d
189, 193 & n.2 (6th Cir. 1959). See also Athey v. Netherlands Ins. Co., 200
Cal. App. 2d 10, 16, 19 Cal. Rptr. 89, 92 (1962) (see cases cited); Woodrich
Constr. Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 252 Minn. 86, 89 N.W.2d
412 (1958).
78 E.g., Note, Conflicting Interpretations Of "Other Insurance" Clauses,
28 INb. L.J. 429, 435 (1953); Note, Automobile Liability Insurance-Effect Of
Double Coverage And "Other Insurance" Clauses, 38 MnxmN. L. REV. 838, 855
(1954); 5 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 157, 160 (1958); cf. Comment, Concurrent Coverage
In Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 319, 330 (1965). Contra,
Watston, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs. L.J. 151, 156-57.
79 Watson, The "Other Insurance" Dilemma, 1966 INs. L.J. 151, 156.
80 Id. at 157.
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these policies indicates an intent not to be liable for the entire loss
when there is double coverage. Prorating the loss among the insurers
gives effect to this intent, though it must be admitted that the intent
of each insurer as to how the loss should be distributed is disregarded

by this solution. The net effect of the Oregon Rule, then, is to give
effect to the common intent of all insurers not to be liable for the
entire loss, rather than to give complete effect to the intention of one

insurer while completely disregarding the intention of another insurer. In short, the Oregon Rule recognizes that conflicting "other
insurance" clauses are mutually repugnant and impossible to reconcile.
The California Position

Unfortunately, California must be numbered among those jurisrule when resolving conflicts between
dictions adopting the majority
"other insurance" clauses.81 However, California has not always been
entrenched so firmly in the majority camp as it now appears to be.
In fact, a brief examination of its case history indicates that if certain
cases had been analyzed properly, the Oregon Rule might have been
adopted in California.
The California pattern was initiated with Air Transportation
Manufacturing Company v. Employers' Liability Assurance Corporation,8 2 which was decided in 1949, three years before the Oregon Rule
was pronounced. In this case, the appellate court in effect prorated
the loss in a prorate v. limited excess clause conflict. The court determined, as far as the limited excess clause was concerned, that there
was "other valid and collectible insurance" for only a proportionate
amount of the loss and that the insurer using the limited excess clause
was required to assume the remaining loss.
Another conflict arose between prorate and limited excess clauses
83
in Peerless Casualty Company v. Continental Casualty Company,
which was decided in 1956. The court treated the limited excess
clause as an escape clause and again prorated the loss. Although the
Oregon Rule was considered, the court would not prorate on the
basis of that rule alone, but relied upon the Air Transport decision
and the general disfavor of escape clauses as well.8 4
81 E.g., Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 318,
419 P.2d 641, 54 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966) (prorate v. prorate v. excess); Ohio
Farmers Indem. Co. v. Interinsurance Exch., 266 A.C.A. 849, 72 Cal. Rptr. 269
(1968) (prorate v. excess); Home Indem. Co. v. Mission Ins. Co., 251 Cal. App.
2d 942, 60 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1967) (prorate v. excess); Wilshire Ins. Co. v. Transit
Cas. Co., 248 Cal. App. 2d 719, 56 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1967) (prorate v. excess).
While no California case involving a conflict between a true escape clause
and an excess clause was found, there is little doubt that effect will be given
to the excess clause. See text accompanying note 94 infra.
Regarding prorate v. escape conflicts see notes 49-53 and accompanying
text supra.
82 91 Cal. App. 2d 129, 204 P.2d 647 (1949).
83 144 Cal. App. 2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956).
84 Id. at 623, 301 P.2d at 607.
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A year after Peerless Casualty, in American Automobile Insurance Company v. Seaboard Surety Company, 5 the rulings of Air
Transport and Peerless Casualty were relied upon to prorate the
loss in a prorate v. excess clause conflict. It seemed as though California was recognizing the more desirable Oregon Rule by permitting
proration between the conflicting clauses.
In Fireman's Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company,8 6 decided in 1959, a California court was again confronted
with a prorate v. excess conflict. The court in this case, however,
misinterpreted
Air Transport as involving a prorate v. escape con8 7
flict.

Additionally, it misinterpreted Peerless Casualty as involv-

ing a prorate v. excess conflict, but held that it was not controlling
authority since it was based upon Air Transport.8 American Automobile v. SeaboardSurety was distinguished because, of the two policies involved, one was not an automobile policy.8 9 The court therefore resolved the conflict by giving effect to the excess clause.
An examination of the limited excess clauses used in Air Transport and PeerlessCasualty shows that they produce identical results. 0
It is difficult to see how, after more than a superficial examination of
these clauses, one could be called an excess clause and the other
an escape clause, especially when the insurers using them each incurred liability for the so-called excess loss. But, having eliminated
the leading California precedents, Fireman's Insurance adopted the
majority rule by giving effect to the excess clause.
The majority rule, as applied in Fireman's Insurance, was
followed in two subsequent cases decided by the California Supreme
Court.9 1 Neither case mentioned any of the decisions discussed
above, but one did acknowledge that the result reached involved circular reasoning. 92 In 1963, the rule of Air Transport was tem93
porarily revived in Colby v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company,
without mention of either supreme court case. However, since Colby,
it has been
settled .. . that, in determining the respective liabilities of insurers
under separate indemnity policies covering the same loss, an applicable "excess insurance" provision in one of the policies, absent an applicable "excess insurance" provision in the other, is given effect
85 155 Cal. App. 2d 192, 318 P.2d 84 (1957).
86 170 Cal. App. 2d 698, 339 P.2d 602 (1959).
87 Id. at 701, 339 P.2d at 604.
88 Id. at 702, 339 P.2d at 604.
89 170 Cal. App. 2d 698, 702, 339 P.2d 602, 604 (1959).
90 The clauses are set forth in note 50 supra.
91 Continental Cas. Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 57 Cal. 2d 27, 366 P.2d 455,
17 Cal. Rptr. 12 (1961); American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co. of
America, 52 Cal. 2d 507, 341 P.2d 675 (1959).
92 American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Republic Indem. Co. of America, 52 Cal.
2d 507, 512, 341 P.2d 675, 678 (1959).
93 220 Cal. App. 2d 38, 33 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1963).
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even though inequities ... result.9 4

Recommendations
As is apparent from the foregoing discussion, whenever a double
insurance situation occurs in the automobile liability field, a potential
conflict arises between the involved insurance companies because of
the mutually exclusive nature of the "other insurance" clauses that
may be contained in each of their policies. Although courts have
settled the conflicts as the opportunity was offered to them, their
solutions have not been so acceptable as to negate the need for
further litigation as subsequent double insurance situations occur.
Consequently, courts95 and authors9 6 alike have called for legislation.
When similar confusion and conflict existed in the property insurance field, legislation proved effective in resolving the problem.9 7
For example, in California the standard form fire insurance policy
has a provision for prorating the loss in double insurance situations. 9
Such a provision would be equally appropriate in the automobile liability field and would, in effect, be a statutory recognition of the
Oregon Rule.
Another legislative proposal worth considering would prohibit
escape and limited excess clauses, thereby codifying the general judicial disapproval of such clauses.99 Under this proposal, the regular
excess clause would be permitted only in specified situations and
the prorate clause would be generally allowed. 0 0 This proposal, if
adopted, essentially would be a statutory recognition of the Oregon
Rule since only the prorate clause would be generally allowed.
Unquestionably, a conflict exists when two or more insurers
94

Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v. Interinsurance Exch., 266 A.C.A. 849, 854,

72 Cal. Rptr. 269, 272 (1968).
95 "Unfortunately there is no statute

....
" Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 195 F.2d 958, 959 (9th Cir. 1952). See also
American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Transport Indem. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 543, 19 Cal.

Rptr. 558 (1962), where Justice Tobriner commented:

"This is another of the

plethora of cases coming to the courts in which insurance carriers engage in an
internecine struggle to determine which carrier should discharge a loss under
primary and 'excess' coverage provisions.

In entering the legalistic labyrinth

of the provisions of the policies we are not favored like Theseus with any
thread of principle; each case apparently presents a particularistic and unique
problem. The obscurities of overlapping coverage have, indeed, led some experts to urge legislative clarification." Id. at 544, 19 Cal. Rptr. at 559.

96 E.g., Russ, supra note 5, at 191; Comment, Concurrent Coverage In
Automobile Liability Insurance, 65 COLum. L. REv. 319, 331 (1965).

Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage, 40 Dm'.vE

Contra,

L. CENTR J.

259, 271 (1963).

See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
§ 2071.
99 Russ, supra note 5, at 191. Since courts treat limited excess clauses
as escape clauses, it can be said that limited excess clauses also find disfavor
with the courts. E.g., Peerless Cas. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Cal. App.
97

98 CAL. INs. CoDE

2d 617, 301 P.2d 602 (1956).

100 Russ, supra note 5, at 191.

1308

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 20

with differing "other insurance" clauses cover the same loss. There
has been little agreement as to the proper resolution of this conflict
as evidenced by the multitude of tests and rules advanced by the
courts. It is here suggested that the most rational and equitable solution is to disregard all "other insurance" clauses and simply prorate the loss between all obligated insurers, i.e., apply the Oregon
Rule. 10 1 Considering, however, the reluctance of most courts, including those of California, to adopt this rule, it is further suggested
that legislation is needed before this resolution will be effectively
accomplished.
James L. Welch*
101 If the majority rule is adhered to by most jurisdictions as it presently is, it would seem that many insurers will begin using excess clauses
exclusively, primarily because of the favored treatment that provision is
given by the courts. See Snow, Other Insurance Clauses-Multiple Coverage,
40 DENvER L. CENm= J. 259, 268-69 (1963). If, however, excess clauses do
become prevalent, most losses will be prorated because most conflicts will
involve two or more excess clauses.
* Member, Second Year Class

